- May 08, 2018
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Guenter Roeck authored
hrtimer_init_on_stack() needs a matching call to destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(), so both need to be exported. Signed-off-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit c08376ac) [astrachan: Fixes {i386,amd64}-allmodconfig build failure in vsoc.ko noticed by kernelci.org project building kernel/common] Bug: 79376877 Change-Id: If4d5c466255019322ea21ef38ee5b1b382cce969 Signed-off-by:
Alistair Strachan <astrachan@google.com>
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- May 07, 2018
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Linus Torvalds authored
commit ae665016 upstream. 范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire. The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the lo_refcnt to zero. In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues. Reported-by:
范龙飞 <long7573@126.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dmitry Torokhov authored
commit a5082947 upstream. parse_hid_report_descriptor() has a while (i < length) loop, which only guarantees that there's at least 1 byte in the buffer, but the loop body can read multiple bytes which causes out-of-bounds access. Reported-by:
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Wei Wang authored
Bug: 79166848 Change-Id: I41d2fe57b377e305b4b68c30c98ee94643d142e4 Test: Build a kernel with trace_prink and see warning Signed-off-by:Wei Wang <wvw@google.com>
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Alistair Strachan authored
Signed-off-by:
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Alistair Strachan authored
Fix "warning: cast to pointer from integer of different size" when printing the region shm physical address. Use the %pa conversion specifier and pass the resource by reference. Signed-off-by:
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Alistair Strachan authored
This driver uses kmalloc/kcalloc/kfree without including <linux/slab.h>. Affects some defconfigs. Fixes: 692acd7b ("FROMLIST: staging: Android: Add 'vsoc' driver for cuttlefish.") Bug: 70214720 Change-Id: Ic03348415e0ba6c36387ed09551de038063f129c Signed-off-by:
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Alistair Strachan authored
Bug: 70214720 Change-Id: Id346ab1489ecaaef8e9e66b084cc416dd0581f69 Signed-off-by: -
Alistair Strachan authored
This file is based on x86_64_defconfig, merged with the base and recommended configs from configs.git, with the virtio drivers enabled and some spurious kernel features turned off. (This version differs from the 4.4 version because it uses the does not set CONFIG_PHYSICAL_START which breaks `qemu -dtb'. Also, virtio-gpu is not enabled because it was not present in 3.18.) Bug: 70214720 Change-Id: I61bde941e8cfef2dd83cb4ff040f7380922cc44e Signed-off-by: -
Greg Hartman authored
The cuttlefish system is a virtual SoC architecture based on QEMU. It uses the QEMU ivshmem feature to share memory regions between guest and host with a custom protocol. Signed-off-by:
Greg Hartman <ghartman@google.com> [sent upstream via staging https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10339507/ ] Bug: 70214720 Change-Id: Iaf5d7536898329a66d00764d8892d1395164519e Signed-off-by:
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- Apr 03, 2018
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Xin Long authored
[ Upstream commit df80cd9b ] Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old key in hashtable. As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable, it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc and dereferencing those transports. This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with syzkaller fuzz testing with this series: socket$inet6_sctp() bind$inet6() sendto$inet6() unshare(0x40000000) getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST() getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF() This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not go out-sync with the key in hashtable. Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually different. Reported-by:
ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mohamed Ghannam authored
[ Upstream commit 8f659a03 ] inet->hdrincl is racy, and could lead to uninitialized stack pointer usage, so its value should be read only once. Change-Id: Ica39e858e311e5654e3b98f695d378fffa7fcae0 Fixes: c008ba5b ("ipv4: Avoid reading user iov twice after raw_probe_proto_opt") Signed-off-by:
Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
commit 794b4bc2 upstream. With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.] Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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- Feb 28, 2018
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Willem de Bruijn authored
[ Upstream commit 4971613c ] Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical across sockets in the group. If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent with that of the fanout group. Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race. I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually observe the race. Fixes: dc99f600 ("packet: Add fanout support.") Signed-off-by:
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by:
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Willem de Bruijn authored
[ Upstream commit 008ba2a1 ] Packet socket bind operations must hold the po->bind_lock. This keeps po->running consistent with whether the socket is actually on a ptype list to receive packets. fanout_add unbinds a socket and its packet_rcv/tpacket_rcv call, then binds the fanout object to receive through packet_rcv_fanout. Make it hold the po->bind_lock when testing po->running and rebinding. Else, it can race with other rebind operations, such as that in packet_set_ring from packet_rcv to tpacket_rcv. Concurrent updates can result in a socket being added to a fanout group twice, causing use-after-free KASAN bug reports, among others. Reported independently by both trinity and syzkaller. Verified that the syzkaller reproducer passes after this patch. Change-Id: I5de8219db37646aeb45aa20b9361082ece9457dc Fixes: dc99f600 ("packet: Add fanout support.") Reported-by:
nixioaming <nixiaoming@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 124751d5 upstream. USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free error as spotted by syzkaller like: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52 print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490 __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779 .... Allocated by task 1484: save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772 kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493 kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666 snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540 create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516 snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560 create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59 snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560 usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618 .... Freed by task 1484: save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412 slab_free mm/slub.c:2988 kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919 snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244 snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250 __snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91 snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244 snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461 release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181 device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814 .... Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for the error-path, too. In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing. Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface for not performing the disconnection procedure twice. Reported-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit bfc81a8b upstream. When a USB-audio device receives a maliciously adjusted or corrupted buffer descriptor, the USB-audio driver may access an out-of-bounce value at its parser. This was detected by syzkaller, something like: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006b83a9e8 by task kworker/0:1/24 CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #224 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52 print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427 snd_usb_create_streams sound/usb/card.c:248 usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0 sound/usb/card.c:605 usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413 driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557 __device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653 bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463 __device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710 device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757 bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523 device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835 usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932 generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174 usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266 really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413 driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557 __device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653 bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463 __device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710 device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757 bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523 device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835 usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903 hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009 port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115 hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195 process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119 worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253 kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231 ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431 This patch adds the checks of out-of-bounce accesses at appropriate places and bails out when it goes out of the given buffer. Reported-by:
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
commit bd7a3fe7 upstream. Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for a USB interface association descriptor. He writes: It seems there's no proper size check of a USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION descriptor. It's only checked that the size is >= 2 in usb_parse_configuration(), so find_iad() might do out-of-bounds access to intf_assoc->bInterfaceCount. And he's right, we don't check for crazy descriptors of this type very well, so resolve this problem. Yet another issue found by syzkaller... Reported-by:
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Jaejoong Kim authored
commit f043bfc9 upstream. The hid descriptor identifies the length and type of subordinate descriptors for a device. If the received hid descriptor is smaller than the size of the struct hid_descriptor, it is possible to cause out-of-bounds. In addition, if bNumDescriptors of the hid descriptor have an incorrect value, this can also cause out-of-bounds while approaching hdesc->desc[n]. So check the size of hid descriptor and bNumDescriptors. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006c5f8edf by task kworker/1:2/1261 CPU: 1 PID: 1261 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #169 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52 print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427 usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1004 hid_add_device+0x16b/0xb30 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2944 usbhid_probe+0xc28/0x1100 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1369 usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361 really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413 driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557 __device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653 bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463 __device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710 device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757 bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523 device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835 usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932 generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174 usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266 really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413 driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557 __device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653 bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463 __device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710 device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757 bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523 device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835 usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903 hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009 port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115 hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195 process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119 worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253 kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231 ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431 Reported-by:
Jaejoong Kim <climbbb.kim@gmail.com> Tested-by:
Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Alan Stern authored
commit 1c0edc36 upstream. Andrey used the syzkaller fuzzer to find an out-of-bounds memory access in usb_get_bos_descriptor(). The code wasn't checking that the next usb_dev_cap_header structure could fit into the remaining buffer space. This patch fixes the error and also reduces the bNumDeviceCaps field in the header to match the actual number of capabilities found, in cases where there are fewer than expected. Reported-by:
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 299d7572 upstream. Make sure to reset the USB-console port pointer when console setup fails in order to avoid having the struct usb_serial be prematurely freed by the console code when the device is later disconnected. Fixes: 73e487fd ("[PATCH] USB console: fix disconnection issues") Acked-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Alan Stern authored
commit 786de92b upstream. The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the intf->altsetting array, which it isn't. Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed, and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption. This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation. Signed-off-by:
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- Feb 08, 2018
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Chenbo Feng authored
When multiple threads is trying to tag/delete the same socket at the same time, there is a chance the tag_ref_entry of the target socket to be null before the uid_tag_data entry is freed. It is caused by the ctrl_cmd_tag function where it doesn't correctly grab the spinlocks when tagging a socket. Signed-off-by:Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Bug: 65853158 Change-Id: I5d89885918054cf835370a52bff2d693362ac5f0
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- Feb 07, 2018
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Viktor Slavkovic authored
commit 443064cb upstream. A lock-unlock is missing in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl which can result in a race condition when mmap is called. After the !asma->file check, before setting asma->size, asma->file can be set in mmap. That would result in having different asma->size than the mapped memory size. Combined with ASHMEM_UNPIN ioctl and shrinker invocation, this can result in memory corruption. Signed-off-by:
Viktor Slavkovic <viktors@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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- Feb 05, 2018
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Eric Biggers authored
commit 4dca6ea1 upstream. When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However, there is actually no permission check. This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING) then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring. Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring. Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key(). Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used. We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also, request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable. We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976 ("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where /sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users who actually do that, though...) Fixes: 3e30148c ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key") Signed-off-by:
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Ming Lei authored
commit 0048b483 upstream. Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously wrong because the request can be freed any time and some fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops might be triggered[1]. Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is that the flush request can share same tag with the request cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag] with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned from) of the tag. Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch. Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag]. [1] kernel oops log [ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M [ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M [ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M [ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M [ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M [ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M [ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M [ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M [ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M [ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M [ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M [ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M [ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M [ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M [ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M [ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M [ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M [ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M [ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M [ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M [ 439.730500] Stack:^M [ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M [ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M [ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M [ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M [ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M [ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M [ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M [ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M [ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M [ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M [ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M [ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M [ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89 f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b 53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10 ^M [ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M [ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M [ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M [ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M Signed-off-by:
Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 71105998 upstream. There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread. Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1 ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511 ___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460 __slab_alloc+0x20/0x40 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190 snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0 SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75 INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717 __slab_free+0x204/0x310 kfree+0x15f/0x180 port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq] snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0 SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82 [<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160 [<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40 [<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520 [<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] [<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30 [<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] [<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq] [<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0 [<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq] [<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq] [<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80 [<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0 ..... We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(), and this is moved inside the lock. This fix covers CVE-2017-15265. Reported-and-tested-by:
Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com> Suggested-by:
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Kirill A. Shutemov authored
commit a8f97366 upstream. Currently, we unconditionally make page table dirty in touch_pmd(). It may result in false-positive can_follow_write_pmd(). We may avoid the situation, if we would only make the page table entry dirty if caller asks for write access -- FOLL_WRITE. The patch also changes touch_pud() in the same way. Signed-off-by:
Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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- Jan 25, 2018
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Tom Herbert authored
commit fc9e50f5 upstream. The start callback allows the caller to set up a context for the dump callbacks. Presumably, the context can then be destroyed in the done callback. Signed-off-by:
Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Signed-off-by:
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- Jan 24, 2018
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Herbert Xu authored
commit 1137b5e2 upstream. An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program. The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive buffer is full. This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation. Fixes: 12a169e7 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list") Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
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Kevin Cernekee authored
[ Upstream commit 93c64764 ] Currently, a nlmon link inside a child namespace can observe systemwide netlink activity. Filter the traffic so that nlmon can only sniff netlink messages from its own netns. Test case: vpnns -- bash -c "ip link add nlmon0 type nlmon; \ ip link set nlmon0 up; \ tcpdump -i nlmon0 -q -w /tmp/nlmon.pcap -U" & sudo ip xfrm state add src 10.1.1.1 dst 10.1.1.2 proto esp \ spi 0x1 mode transport \ auth sha1 0x6162633132330000000000000000000000000000 \ enc aes 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 grep --binary abc123 /tmp/nlmon.pcap Signed-off-by:
Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
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Alan Stern authored
commit 48a4ff1c upstream. A malicious USB device with crafted descriptors can cause the kernel to access unallocated memory by setting the bNumInterfaces value too high in a configuration descriptor. Although the value is adjusted during parsing, this adjustment is skipped in one of the error return paths. This patch prevents the problem by setting bNumInterfaces to 0 initially. The existing code already sets it to the proper value after parsing is complete. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
commit af3ff804 upstream. Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))" through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow. This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer, and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that, but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything. Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed. Here is a reproducer: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main() { int algfd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "hash", .salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))", }; char key[4096] = { 0 }; algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key)); } Here was the KASAN report from syzbot: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161 Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044 CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline] check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303 memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161 crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109 shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151 crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165 hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152 crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165 shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172 crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186 hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66 crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64 shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207 crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200 hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446 alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline] alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Reported-by:
syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nicolai Stange authored
commit 9561475d upstream. The driver_override implementation is susceptible to a race condition when different threads are reading vs. storing a different driver override. Add locking to avoid the race condition. This is in close analogy to commit 62655397 ("driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override") from Adrian Salido. Fixes: 782a985d ("PCI: Introduce new device binding path using pci_dev.driver_override") Signed-off-by:
Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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- Jan 19, 2018
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Catalin Marinas authored
With ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN enabled, the exception entry code checks the active ASID to decide whether user access was enabled (non-zero ASID) when the exception was taken. On return from exception, if user access was previously disabled, it re-instates TTBR0_EL1 from the per-thread saved value (updated in switch_mm() or efi_set_pgd()). Commit 7655abb9 ("arm64: mm: Move ASID from TTBR0 to TTBR1") makes a TTBR0_EL1 + ASID switching non-atomic. Subsequently, commit 27a921e7 ("arm64: mm: Fix and re-enable ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN") changes the __uaccess_ttbr0_disable() function and asm macro to first write the reserved TTBR0_EL1 followed by the ASID=0 update in TTBR1_EL1. If an exception occurs between these two, the exception return code will re-instate a valid TTBR0_EL1. Similar scenario can happen in cpu_switch_mm() between setting the reserved TTBR0_EL1 and the ASID update in cpu_do_switch_mm(). This patch reverts the entry.S check for ASID == 0 to TTBR0_EL1 and disables the interrupts around the TTBR0_EL1 and ASID switching code in __uaccess_ttbr0_disable(). It also ensures that, when returning from the EFI runtime services, efi_set_pgd() doesn't leave a non-zero ASID in TTBR1_EL1 by using uaccess_ttbr0_{enable,disable}. The accesses to current_thread_info()->ttbr0 are updated to use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE. As a safety measure, __uaccess_ttbr0_enable() always masks out any existing non-zero ASID TTBR1_EL1 before writing in the new ASID. Fixes: 27a921e7 ("arm64: mm: Fix and re-enable ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN") Acked-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reported-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by:
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Tested-by:
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> (cherry picked from git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git commit 6b88a32c) Change-Id: I1597fe926e4d7fc0f2c19dc63efbd359b5033796 [ghackmann@google.com: - adjust context - apply asm-uaccess.h changes to uaccess.h, and efi.h changes to efi.c] Signed-off-by:
Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
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Marc Zyngier authored
We will soon need to invoke a CPU-specific function pointer after changing page tables, so move post_ttbr_update_workaround out into C code to make this possible. Signed-off-by:
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- Jan 08, 2018
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Will Deacon authored
Although CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 does make KASLR more robust, it's actually more useful as a mitigation against speculation attacks that can leak arbitrary kernel data to userspace through speculation. Reword the Kconfig help message to reflect this, and make the option depend on EXPERT so that it is on by default for the majority of users. Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
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Will Deacon authored
Speculation attacks against the entry trampoline can potentially resteer the speculative instruction stream through the indirect branch and into arbitrary gadgets within the kernel. This patch defends against these attacks by forcing a misprediction through the return stack: a dummy BL instruction loads an entry into the stack, so that the predicted program flow of the subsequent RET instruction is to a branch-to-self instruction which is finally resolved as a branch to the kernel vectors with speculation suppressed. Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
The literal pool entry for identifying the vectors base is the only piece of information in the trampoline page that identifies the true location of the kernel. This patch moves it into a page-aligned region of the .rodata section and maps this adjacent to the trampoline text via an additional fixmap entry, which protects against any accidental leakage of the trampoline contents. Suggested-by:
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by:
Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
There are now a handful of open-coded masks to extract the ASID from a TTBR value, so introduce a TTBR_ASID_MASK and use that instead. Suggested-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by:
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